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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
above reproach,"' an implication which prompted the ma-
jority to state their confidence in the integrity of the
prosecution.8 2 In the light of these considerations Justice
Whittaker's proposal in his concurring opinion would
seem to merit further attention. However, such impound-
ing of the grand jury minutes where no indictment is re-
turned would require amending the now existing rules.
Viewing the more modern trend as a whole, it seems
safe to conclude that federal courts generally will take
a middle-of-the-road policy in the strictness with which
they will apply the rules of discovery to the traditionally
secret grand jury minutes. That wholesale discovery of
the minutes should be granted only upon proof that the
proceedings were subverted seems reasonable under the
existing rules if the necessary secrecy is to be substantially
preserved. The further view, that limited and discreet lift-
ing of the non-disclosure rule is justified only when a show-
ing of "good cause" has been demonstrated by proof of
a particular need, is a fair attempt to apply the discovery
rules objectively. While it is true that such an approach
will sometimes work hardships, it is counter-balanced by
the broad scope of the rules of discovery in federal pro-
cedure, which offer the defendant many other means of
gaining the same information. The logic which dictated
the establishment of this tradition of secrecy is based on
far more substantial considerations than that of allowing
a defendant greater thoroughness in preparing his civil
suit.
JOsEPH A. MATERA
Unemployment Insurance Benefits - Refusal
To Answer "Security" Questions As
Wilful Misconduct
Ostrofsky v. Maryland Employment Security Board'
The claimants, employees of Bethlehem Steel Company,
were summoned before the UmAmerican Activities Com-
mittee in Baltimore and were identified by a witness as
former members of the Communist Party. The employees
refused to answer questions concerning their Communist
Supra, n. 1, 690.
Ibid., 684.
1218 Md. 509, 147 A. 2d 741 (1959).
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activities, claiming the privilege against self-incrimination
under the Fifth Amendment. On the following day they
were suspended by Bethlehem as security risks who had
engaged in conduct detrimental to the company's interests.
At a company hearing, held four days later pursuant
to a contract between Bethlehem and the United Steel-
workers of America, the employees' union, claimants re-
fused to answer questions similar to those asked by the
Committee, on the basis that these questions were irrele-
vant and not connected with the performance of their
jobs, as distinguished from the grounds of self-incrimina-
tion claimed before the Committee. The Superior Court
of Baltimore City affirmed a decision of the Board of Ap-
peals of the Department of Employment Security denying
the claimants compensation from the date of their sus-
pension. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision
of the lower court in part and reversing in part, so as to
permit the claimants to draw benefits from the time of
their suspension to the time of their discharge, held the
claimants' refusal to answer the questions propounded by
their employer about their Communist affiliations to be
insubordination and therefore wilful misconduct connected
with their work sufficient to deny unemployment benefits
under the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Act. The
Act provides that an employee will be disqualified for
benefits if he is discharged by his employer for "deliberate
and wilful misconduct connected with his work."'2 In the
"3 MD. CODE (1951) Art. 95A, See. 5 (b) states:
"An individual shall be disqualified for benefits-
For any week in which his unemployment is due to his leaving
work voluntarily without good cause, or to his actual or threatened
deliberate and wilful misconduct connected with his work, if so found
by the Board. Such disqualification shall continue until such in-
dividual has become reemployed and his earnings therein equal to
at least ten (10) times his weekly benefit amount."
MD. LAws 1957, Ch. 441, effective June 1, 1957, amended' the former Sec.
5 (b), so that at present 8 Mn. CODE (1957) Art. 95A, See. 6 (b) reads:
"An individual shall be disqualified for benefits-
For 'any week in which his unemployment is due to his having
been discharged for gross misconduct connected with his work, if
so found by the Executive Director. 'Such disqualification shall con-
tinue until such individual has become re-employed and has earnings
therein equal to at least ten (10) times his weekly benefit amount."
This amendment of the phrase from "deliberate and wilful misconduct"
to "gross misconduct" was recommended to the General Assembly by the
Department of Employment Security because disqualification for criminal
acts, which was expressly described as a basis for disqualification in Sec.
5 (a) of 'the 1951 CODE, could more easily be effected 'by disqualification
for "gross misconduct." When the fiormer Sec. 5 (a) was In force, crim-
inal acts had to be proved to disqualify a person for benefits, and the
Board of Appeals found such proof difficult.
The three cases noted were adjudicated under the terms of the 1951
ConE. Since no change other than the one indicated was desired in the
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subject case and two other recent cases, Employment Se-
curity Board of Maryland v. LeCates3 and Fino v. Maryland
Employment Security Board' (decided on the same day
as the Ostrofsky case), the Court of Appeals was called
upon for the first time to interpret the above phrase, even
though appellate courts in several other states have re-
peatedly dealt with this or similar phrases.5
The question as to what constituted "deliberate and
wilful misconduct" was first raised in the LeCates case.
There the claimant had been discharged because he had
abused a privilege he possessed as a supervisor in a food
processing plant. He had used a key entrusted to him to
gain access to the plant after working hours, used a com-
pany truck without authorization and while not possessing
a driver's license, become involved in an accident, and
left the truck outside the plant without reporting the
incident to anyone. The Court of Appeals, in reversing a
holding of the Circuit Court of Wicomico County that
LeCates was entitled to unemployment insurance benefits
reinstated the decision of the Board of Appeals that Le-
Cates was not entitled to benefits, since he was guilty of
deliberate and wilful misconduct connected with his work.
In deciding the LeCates case the Court pointed out that,
since the Unemployment Insurance Act also provides for
disqualification for "misconduct,"8 as distinguished from
"deliberate and wilful misconduct," the latter must involve
amendment of -he phrase discussed, if the principal cases had been heard
under the terms of the 1957 CODE, the decisions n doubt would have been
the same as they were under the terms of the 1951 CODE.
*218 Md. 202, 145 A. 2d 840 (1958).
'218 Md. 504, 147 A. 2d 738 (1959).
Pennsylvania has perhaps as many appellate decisions on this point
as any other state, and the Court of Appeals cited Pennsylvania cases
frequently in the noted decisions.
68 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 95A, Sec. 6 (c), formerly 3 MD. CODE (1951)
Art. 95A, Sec. 5 (c), provides:
"An individual shall be disqualified for benefits-
For the week in which he has been discharged, or suspended as
a disciplinary measure, for misconduct connected with his work
(other than for acts specified hereinabove in this section), if so found
by the Executive Director and for not less than the one nor more
than the nine weeks which immediately follow such week as deter-
mined by the Executive Director in each case according to the serious-
ness of the misconduct."
See Gordlon v. Maryland Employment Security Board, Daily Record,
July 7, 1955 (Md. 1955), where the court disqualified the claimant for
five weeks' benefits because he had been discharged for misconduct. The
claimant had had two avoidable accidents with his employer's taxi-cab.
Manley, J., stated that misconduct did not consist of "minor and casual
acts of negligence," but of "a series of accidents attributable to negligence,
occurring periodically and with consistent regularity resulting in financial
loss to the employer." Cf. Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249,
296 N.W. 636 (1941).
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a culpability which the former does not; it must be mis-
behavior which evinces a flagrant disregard for the em-
ployer's welfare rather than constituting only an act or
acts of simple negligence.7  Wilful misconduct involves
"'[deliberate violations or disregard of standards' of be-
havior which the employer has the right to expect of his
employee . ". . ."'I The Court found that LeCates' un-
authorized taking of a company truck for his own purposes
showed a disregard for his duties to his employer and "was
calculated to disrupt the discipline . . . requisite to the
proper management.., of a large food processing company
which had given him employment as a supervisor .... 9
In the Ostrofsky case, the Court had to decide whether
the claimants' failure to answer their employer's questions
at the company hearing was wilful misconduct. Claimants
had objected to those questions only on the ground that
they were irrelevant. The Court found that such questions
are relevant because an industry with defense contracts
for the production of steel to protect the nation should be
able to inquire whether workers belong to a political
organization "that has been frequently characterized as
engaged in a conspiracy to overthrow the government by
force and violence, and particularly by the sabotage of
essential industries in the event of war."'" The deliberate
and wilful misconduct of the employee who does not an-
swer such questions is that of insubordination, of refusing
to tell the employer that which he has a right to know.
Similar inquiries by municipal and state agencies have
been held not to violate an employee's Constitutional rights
and to be in fact the basis for discharge of employees who
refused to answer them."
Of more importance in these cases than the question
of what constituted deliberate and wilful misconduct, was
7 See Kempfer, Disqualifications for VoZuntary Leaving and Misconduct,
55 Yale L.J. 147 (1945) ; Sanders, Disqualification for Unemployment In-
surance, 8 Vand. L. Rev. 307 (1955). See also annotation in 146 A.L.R.
243 (1943).
8218 Md. 202, 208, 145 A. 2d 840 (1958), citing 81 C.J.S. 246, Social
Security and Public Welfare, Sec. 162. This test is repeatedly used in
the Pennsylvania misconduct cases; see Ault v. Unemployment Compensa-
tion Board of Review, 188 'Pa. Super. 260, 146 A. 2d 729, 733 (1959).
9 218 Md. 202, 210, 145 A. 2d 840 (1958).
10218 Md. 509, 513, 147 A. 2d 741 (1959).
nGarner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1951);
Beilan v. Board of Public Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958), noted' 44 Corn.
L. Q. 244 (1959) and 72 Harv. L. Rev. 188 (1958) ; Lerner v. Casey, 357
U.S. 468 (1958), noted 44 Corn. L. Q. 244 (1959), 72 Harv. L. Rev. 188
(1958), and 12 Vand. L. Rev. 273 (1958). For a comprehensive review of
cases on the right of an employer to discharge an employee for his political
views, see annotation in 51 A.L.R. 2d 742 (1954).
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the question whether such misconduct was connected with
the work. This question was directly dealt with by the
Court in Fino v. Maryland Employment Security Board."
That case presented the Court with facts similar to those
of the subject case, with the exception that the claimant
was discharged solely because she had refused to answer
questions asked by the Un-American Activities Committee,
as distinguished from her employer. The Superior Court
of Baltimore City affirmed a decision of the Board of Ap-
peals denying Mrs. Fino unemployment benefits as a per-
son who had been discharged for deliberate and wilful
misconduct in connection with her work. The Court of
Appeals reversed the Superior Court and awarded Mrs.
Fino compensation, holding that her misconduct, if any,
was not connected with her work. But before approaching
the problem of whether the claimant's alleged misconduct
was connected with her work according to the language of
Section 5(b) of Article 95A,'3 the Court had to decide
whether Section 5 (a) or Section 2 of Article 95A affected
Section 5 (b). Section 5 (a) disqualifies for benefits a
person who has been discharged for a "dishonest or crim-
inal act committed in connection with or materially affect-
ing his work." The Court refused to transfer the words
"materially affecting his work" to Section 5 (b), which
sets up disqualification for deliberate and wilful miscon-
duct "in connection with his work." Section 2 of Article
95A states that the general purpose of the Unemployment
Compensation Act is to "benefit... persons unemployed
through no fault of their own." The Court, following
Tucker v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., refused to read
the words "through no fault of their own" as an express
disqualification in addition to those disqualifications enu-
merated in Section 5, but read them merely as a statement
of purpose perhaps incongruous with Section 5 and re-
mediable as such only by the Legislature.
Normally the requirement that wilful misconduct be
connected with the work is fulfilled because misconduct
occurs during the employee's duty hours or while he is
on his employer's premises; this is so when the employee
is insubordinate; 1 when he is drunk or drinking on the
"218 Md. 504, 147 A. 2d 738 (1959). The Court in considering the ques-
tion under discussion assumed, without deciding, that Mrs. Fino's refusal
to answer the questions of the Un-American Activities Committee was mis-
conduct.
183 MD. CODE (1951), quoted, supra n. 2.
1"189 Md. 250, 258, 55 A. 2d 692 (1947).
"Detterer v. Board of Review, 168 Pa. Super. 291, 77 A. 2d, 886 (1951).
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job;"6 when he fights with fellow-employees or his em-
ployer; 7 or when, after several warnings, he still shows
a general disregard for standards which his employer has
a right to expect of him. 8 Another circumstance to be
considered in these cases is "'whether the employee took
advantage of the employment relation in order to commit
the act."",9 This circumstance existed in the LeCates case,
where the employee by reason of his supervisory powers
had access to the truck he took without permission. Al-
though the Court thereby found LeCates disqualified for
benefits, the decision concluded with the ambiguous com-
ment that the claimant's misconduct adversely affected
his suitability to continue in his position, thus leaving the
impression that the Court might be adopting the test that
if an employee becomes unsuitable for his job because
of wilful misconduct, the misconduct is connected with
his work. The suitability test has not generally been ac-
cepted and has been criticized on the ground that it would
permit an employer to be the judge of whether an employee
who had misbehaved, away from work on off-duty hours,
had become unsuitable for his job; thus in many cases the
employer would be able, through his testimony, to deny
a discharged employee unemployment benefits.2" It is rele-
vant to note that the Maryland Unemployment Insurance
Act does not equate an employer's right to discharge an
employee with a denial to the employee of a right to draw
unemployment benefits; the suitability test would lead
toward this result in the area of disqualification for mis-
conduct.
In the Fino case, in relating wilful misconduct to the
phrase "in connection with his work", the Court of Appeals
stated:
16... we think the mere fact that misconduct adversely
affects the employer's interest is not enough. It must
be incident to the work, or directly related to the
employment status. In substance the contention is,
not that her (Mrs. Fino's) refusal to answer (the Un-
American Activities Committee) was a breach of any
duty to the employer, but simply that it had a tend-
ency to alienate customers who disapproved of her
1 Suede v. Board of Review, 162 Pa. Super. 479, 58 A. 2d 197 (1948).
17 Thorne v. Board of Review, 167 Pa. Super. 572, 76 A. 2d 485 (1950).
'a Sabatelli v. Board of Review, 168 Pa. Super. 81, 76 A. 2d 654 (1950).
" 218 Md. 202, 211, 145 A. 2d 840 (1958), citing Kempfer, Diaqualifica-
tion8 for Voluntary Leaving and Miaconduct, 55 Yale L. J. 147, 163 (1945).
2Kempfer, supra, n. 19, 165.
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supposed principles. There is no suggestion that her
retention would create any other hazard to the busi-
ness."
21
Therefore the test for connection with the work necessi-
tates the presence of a violation of the employee's duty
toward the employer rather than the mere absence of suit-
ability on the employee's part.2 2 The Court distinguished
the LeCates case on the ground that there the claimant
"took advantage of the employment relation in order to
commit the wrongful act. ' 23 Fino thus restricts LeCates
to its strict holding and refuses to adopt the suitability
test mentioned in that former decision. This conclusion
is emphasized by the citing of a Tennessee case, Milne
Chair Co. v. Hake,2 4 in which the appellate court of that
state recognized that the grounds on which an employer
might discharge an employee differed from the grounds
whereby the discharged employee might be disqualified for
unemployment benefits.
The Court of Appeals in the Ostrofsky case found the
required "misconduct connected with his work" in the
employees' insubordination in refusing to answer relevant
questions of their employer:
"... it was implicit in the employment relationship
that they should answer proper inquiries directed to-
wards threatened misconduct. The employment con-
tract not only obligated them to perform the work as-
signed, satisfactorily, but it also imposed other obli-
gations, such as a duty to answer proper questions re-
lated to the security and safe conduct of the business.
Failure to disclose their beliefs and affiliations in a
matter vital to the future conduct of the business, and
affecting not merely their suitability, but their trust,-
worthiness and reliability in the work, was, we think,
misconduct sufficiently connected with the work to
raise a bar to benefits under the statute. '2 5
The Fino case was distinguished in that there the claimant
had merely failed to answer the Committee's questions
-1218 Md. 504, 508, 147 A. 2d 738 (1959).
2 See Kempfer, supra, n. 19, 165-166; Sanders, Disqualification for Un-
employment Insurance, 8 Vand. L. Rev. 307, 336 (1955) ; Teple, Disquali-
fication: Discharge for Misconduct and Voluntary Quit, 10 Ohio St. L. J.
191, 198 (1949).
Supra, n. 21.
190 Tenn. 395, 230 S.W. 2d 393, 396 (1950).
- 218 Md. 509, 514, 147 A. 2d 741 (1959). See also cases supra, n. 11.
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and had not in any manner breached a duty to her em-
ployer.
The only other reported case with a factual situation
similar to Ostrofsky was that of Ault v. Unemployment
Compensation Board,26 a lower appellate decision in Penn-
sylvania. There the Pennsylvania court similarly found
misconduct in the employees' refusal to answer their em-
ployer's questions, and connection with the work in the
security requirements of a defense industry.
This writer thinks that the three noted cases delineate
rather clearly in Maryland what connection with the work
is necessary for an employee's wilful misconduct to dis-
qualify him for benefits. While it was unfortunate that
the suitability test was ever brought into the LeCates case,
the two later cases definitely decline to use that test; and
we now know that it will not be adopted in Maryland. The
test is distasteful mainly because of the danger inherent
in it that persons who have worked conscientiously at a
job will be denied unemployment benefits because of some-
thing which had nothing to do with their loyalty to their
employer, or to the state.
ROBERT J. CARSON
Relocation Of Easements
Millson v. Laughlin'
Plaintiff and defendant owned and occupied two ad-
jacent lots which had, under a previous owner, been unified
into one tract. During that unity of ownership, a dwelling
house was erected on the portion now owned by defendant.
An electric line was strung to the house from a nearby
road, over an adjacent property, and across the portion of
the tract now owned by plaintiff. A pole, carrying the line
to the house, and holding an electrical transformer was
set up on that portion of the tract. The original owner
sold the northern half of the tract, including the house,
to defendant and in the deed granted defendant use of a
30 foot right of way along the western boundary of the
tract and use in common of an old winding road located
near the same boundary. No mention was made of the
electric line or pole although the usual appurtenance clause
was included in the deed. Defendant obtained title to the
line and pole from the utility company and proceeded to
2188 Pa. Super. 260, 146 A. 2d 729 (1958).
2217 Md. 576, 142 A. 2d 810 (1958).
1959]
